Sellars and the Space of Reasons

John McDowell
University of Pittsburgh, USA icono mail

Received: 10-September-2017 | Accepted: 28-October-2017 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.2560005
Article | [EN] | Analysis [Dec. 2018], Vol. 21, No. 8, pp. 1-22 | ISSN: 2386-3994 |  

How to cite this article [Copyright Notice]:
McDowell, John (2018). «Sellars and the Space of Reasons». Analysis. Claves de Pensamiento Contemporáneo 21, no. 8: pp. 1–22.


Abstract: In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Sellars introduces the image of the space of reasons, and delineates a non-traditional empiricism, uncontaminated by the Myth of the Given. Brandom takes Sellars’s drift to be against empiricism as such, against the very idea that something deserving to be called “experience” could be relevant to the acquisition of empirical knowledge in any way except merely causally. In this paper I attack Brandom’s idea that we anyway need a concession to externalism for non-inferential knowledge and suggest that in the space of reasons Sellars’s, the experience play a more than merely causal role in a fully internalist epistemology of observation.

Key Words: Myth of the Given; Externalism, Experience; Epistemology.

Sellars y el espacio de las razones

Resumen: En Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Sellars presenta la imagen del espacio de las razones y delinea un empirismo no tradicional, no contaminado por el mito de lo dado. Brandom considera que la tendencia de Sellars es contra el empirismo como tal, contra la idea misma de que algo que merece ser llamado “experiencia” podría ser relevante para la adquisición de conocimiento empírico de cualquier manera, excepto meramente causalmente. En este artículo ataco la idea de Brandom de que de todos modos necesitamos una concesión al externalismo por el conocimiento no inferencial y sugiero que en el espacio de razones de Sellars, la experiencia juega un papel más que meramente causal en una epistemología de observación completamente internalista.

Palabras Clave: Mito de lo dado; Externalismo, Experiencia; Epistemología.


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